The Relationship between Trait Empathy and Memory Formation for Social vs. Non-Social Information by Wagner, U. (Ullrich) et al.
Wagner et al. BMC Psychology  (2015) 3:2 
DOI 10.1186/s40359-015-0058-3RESEARCH ARTICLE Open AccessThe relationship between trait empathy and
memory formation for social vs. non-social
information
Ullrich Wagner1,2*, Lisa Handke2 and Henrik Walter2Abstract
Background: To navigate successfully through their complex social environment, humans need both empathic and
mnemonic skills. Little is known on how these two types of psychological abilities relate to each other in humans.
Although initial clinical findings suggest a positive association, systematic investigations in healthy subject samples
have not yet been performed. Differentiating cognitive and affective aspects of empathy, we assumed that
cognitive empathy would be positively associated with general memory performance, while affective empathy, due
to enhanced other-related emotional reactions, would be related to a relative memory advantage for information of
social as compared to non-social relevance.
Methods: We investigated in young healthy participants the relationship between dispositional cognitive and
affective empathy, as measured by Davis’ Interpersonal Reactivity Index (Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 44, 113–126, 1983), and memory formation for stimuli (numbers presented in a lottery choice task)
that could be encoded in either a social (other-related) or a non-social (self-related) way within the task.
Results: Cognitive empathy, specifically perspective taking, correlated with overall memory performance (regardless of
encoding condition), while affective empathy, specifically empathic personal distress, predicted differential memory for
socially vs. non-socially encoded information.
Conclusion: Both cognitive and affective empathy are associated with memory formation, but in different ways,
depending on the social nature of the memory content. These results open new and so far widely neglected avenues
of psychological research on the relationship between social and cognitive skills.
Keywords: Cognitive empathy, Affective empathy, Social memory, Perspective taking, Personal distressBackground
Humans are highly social animals. Successful navigation
through our social life within our cultural environment
is a demanding task, requiring constant tracking and in-
terpretation of others’ behavior. A central psychological
skill that humans have developed to meet these demands
is empathy, the ability to understand and to share the
mental states of others, which encompasses cognitive
empathy (mentally representing other’s thoughts, feel-
ings, and intentions, frequently also called perspective* Correspondence: ullrich.wagner@charite.de
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unless otherwise stated.taking, mentalizing, or “Theory of Mind”) and affective
empathy (aligning one’s own with another person’s
emotional state) (Davis, 1983; Baron-Cohen and
Wheelwright, 2004). Another critical skill that we con-
stantly need in our social life relates to memory. In
order to interact appropriately within society, we must
not only be able to remember other individuals per se,
but also how they have behaved in the past, and how we
have behaved towards them in previous interactions.
Are our mnemonic abilities associated with empathy?
And if so, does this relationship apply to both cognitive
and affective empathy, and is it specifically conducive to
social memory, i.e. stronger in social as compared to
non-social encoding contexts? Evolutionary accounts
proposing a tight interaction between of cognitive andl. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
ommons.org/licenses/by/4.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
iginal work is properly credited. The Creative Commons Public Domain
g/publicdomain/zero/1.0/) applies to the data made available in this article,
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human brain within primate evolution (e.g., Dunbar
and Shultz 2007; Pinker 2010) would indeed suggest
such associations.
Still, relatively little is known about answers to these
questions, probably because in basic psychological re-
search, memory and empathy have traditionally been
treated as research topics belonging to different domains
of psychology, i.e. cognitive psychology and social and
personality psychology, respectively. However, there are
initial clinical findings that indeed point to a positive re-
lationship between empathy and memory functions. Spe-
cifically, patients primarily characterized by memory
deficits appear to concomitantly show reduced empathic
abilities, in particular in cognitive empathy, as has been re-
ported in dementia patients (Cuerva et al. 2001; Gregory
et al. 2002; Zaitchik et al., 2006; Fernandez-Duque et al.
2010). In these studies, patients with Alzheimer’s disease
(and in the study by Fernandez-Duque et al. additionally
also patients with frontotemporal dementia) were assessed
in tests in which they had to explicitly infer the beliefs,
feelings or thoughts of another person from film material
of an interview with the other person or from verbal de-
scriptions of false belief stories. In false belief stories, ori-
ginally developed by Perner and Wimmer (1985) in the
context of developmental psychology, participants have to
recognize that a target person has a different view on or
state of knowledge of a scene than oneself or other per-
sons. These tests of “Theory of Mind” can be varied in
difficulty, depending on the level of perspective-taking
that they require. Alzheimer patients as well as patients
with frontotemporal dementia were impaired in these
perspective-taking tasks, especially when these were diffi-
cult. Additional findings suggested that the deficits were
related to other cognitive impairments in these patients,
including their memory impairments, which were most
pronounced in those subjects who did not pass the diffi-
cult perspective-taking tests (Cuerva et al., 2001; Zaitchik
et al., 2006). Although little focus has been on the aspect
of emotional empathy in these clinical studies, at least one
study also reported deficits in this domain in Alzheimer
patients (Laisney et al., 2013), using the Reading the Mind
in the Eyes Test by Baron-Cohen et al. (2001), which re-
quires participants to recognize the emotional state of a
person form a picture that only shows the eye region of
that person.
Finally, a study by Beadle et al. (2013) assessed empathy
in another type of patients with memory impairment, i.e.
amnesic patients with hippocampal damage. These au-
thors did not apply formal behavioral tests like the false
belief task, but assessed dispositional empathy of the
patients, as measured by the Interpersonal Reactivity
Index (IRI) from Davis (1983). This trait questionnaire,
comprising four subscales, likewise distinguishes betweencognitive and affective aspects of empathy, with two sub-
scales (perspective taking and fantasy) representing the
former one and the two other subscales (empathic con-
cern and personal distress) representing the latter one.
The amnesic patients showed reduced empathy on all
scales, which was most pronounced for cognitive empathy
(perspective taking). In parallel to the reduced trait em-
pathy, the same patients also showed attenuated responses
to experimental empathy induction in comparison to
healthy controls (Beadle et al., 2013). These deficits may
be the reason for inappropriate character judgments and
reduced social networks observed in such amnesic pa-
tients (Croft et al., 2010; Davidson et al., 2012).
Here, we aimed to extend these initial findings from the
clinical domain by investigating the relationship between
specific aspects of empathy and memory in a sample
of healthy participants. Although the clinical results pro-
vide valuable information on how different psychological
mechanisms are related to each other, we think that it is
important to extend this field also into basic research in
healthy populations to get a clearer picture on the normal
processes that determine the relationship between pro-
cesses of empathy and memory formation. This is desir-
able for several reasons. First, the basic mechanisms in
patients may differ qualitatively from those in healthy sub-
jects, either due to the disturbances in the neural system
or due to compensatory mechanisms. Thus the concomi-
tant lack in two domains in neurologically disturbed pa-
tients does not necessarily imply that the processes in
these two domains are also connected to each other under
normal circumstances. Second, most patient studies are
inherently investigating only participants of older age, and
especially in studies based on case reports of patients,
some abnormalities could also result of idiosyncratic cir-
cumstances in certain individuals. Third, although several
studies as cited above suggest a relationship between em-
pathy and memory, at least one patient study has been
performed that suggests independence of these two do-
mains (Rosenbaum et al., 2007), so it is worthwhile to spe-
cify the relationship directly in a sample of young healthy
participants.
Hence, we present here a study investigating the rela-
tionship between dispositional empathy, as measured by
the IRI mentioned above, and the encoding of new infor-
mation in memory in a sample of healthy students. As an
additional novel aspect, not yet considered in previous
studies, we also took, apart from memory performance
per se, the social factor of memory encoding into account,
i.e. whether information is encoded in a social (other-
related) or in a non-social (self-related) way. Memory was
tested in a standard recognition test for the socially vs.
non-socially encoded information. We expected the social
factor to play an additional important role, because highly
empathic participants should be more sensitive towards
Figure 1 Example of a lottery choice slide presented during
memory encoding. Each circle represents a lottery, which could have a
financial gain (positive numbers on green part of a circle) or a financial
loss (negative numbers on red part of a circle) as an outcome. A choice
had to be made which of the two lotteries would actually be played. In
half of the trials, the financial gain or loss of the lottery played was
assigned to the participant (non-social encoding condition), in the other
half to another person in need (social encoding condition; see text, for
details). In an active choice condition, participants selected the lottery to
be played themselves, while in a passive choice condition, the computer
made the choice randomly. (A slide in the beginning of each trial
announced the respective experimental condition of the trial, i.e.
whether it was social vs. nonsocial and whether it was active or passive).
After the choice had been made, the chosen lottery was marked, and
finally the outcome of both lotteries was shown. Memory for all
numbers presented in the lottery task was assessed in a subsequent
recognition memory test. During performance of the lottery choice task,
participants were not aware that a recognition memory test for the
numbers would follow.
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With regard to memory supporting mechanisms, such in-
creased sensitivity towards social information should be
effective to the extent in which it induces emotional pro-
cessing of stimuli, because an emotional way of stimulus
encoding is well-known to promote memory formation
(Christianson 1992). We therefore expected specifically
affective empathy, which is defined by emotional empathic
reactivity towards others, to be positively associated with a
relative memory advantage for social as compared to non-
social memory encoding, although we did not anticipate
which of the two facets of affective empathy assessed by the
IRI (i.e. empathic concern or personal distress) would pri-
marily show this association. However, regarding memory
performance per se (regardless of social or non-social en-
coding conditions), we expected a specific association with
cognitive empathy, and in particular perspective taking,
which would confirm the general picture from the clinical
studies cited above. Finally, we also introduced the factor of
active vs. passive encoding, which has been reported to
affect memory encoding (e.g., Watanabe and Soraci, 2004)
and might therefore also be a moderator for the relationship
between dispositional empathy and memory as assessed
here.
Methods
Participants
Twenty-three healthy participants (all white, 10 female)
without a history of neurological or psychological disor-
ders were recruited at the Charité Universitätsmedizin
Berlin and the Free University Berlin for the experiment.
Participants’ ages ranged between 19 and 31 years (mean =
23.61 years). Participants gave informed written consent
and were paid for participation. The study was approved by
the ethics committee of the Department of Psychiatry and
Psychotherapy at the Charité Universitätsmedizin Berlin,
Campus Mitte.
Procedure
Participants first performed a decision-making task as
described in detail previously (Wagner et al. 2012), in
which numbers – indicating potential gains or losses of
lotteries – were processed in either a social or a nonso-
cial experimental condition. In each trial, a choice had
to be made between two “wheel of fortune” lotteries
(Figure 1), each featuring a win and a loss outcome with
corresponding outcome probabilities. The probabilities
of the possible financial gain or loss were represented by
the relative size of colored sectors of a circle (green for
win probabilities and red for loss probabilities). The ex-
tent of the possible gains and losses in a given trial was
indicated by positive numbers on the green part of the
respective circle (for the possible gains) and negative
numbers on the red part of the respective circle (for thepossible losses). These numbers represented Euro cents
that could be won or lost in the respective lottery, which
could be up to 500 cents per trial, i.e. presented values
ranged between −500 and 500.
Critically, in half of the trials this amount of money was
assigned to the participant (self-related = non-social con-
dition), while in the other half of the trials it was assigned
to another person (other-related = social condition). For
all participants, the specified beneficiary of all the earnings
in the social condition was a 4-year old Ukrainian girl in
need of medical treatment, for which a local charity
organization was collecting donations. Participants re-
ceived detailed information about the organization and
about the Ukrainian girl and her disease in the beginning
of the experiment. For this purpose, they were shown the
website of the organization presenting the project, and
they also read a printed one-page summary. The money
won for the Ukrainian girl in the experiment was actually
transferred to the account of the charity organization
afterwards. To ensure that participants believed this, they
were informed in advance that in the end of the experi-
ment, they would sign not only the money transfer form
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organization collecting money for the child.
In addition to this factor of social vs. non-social process-
ing, half of the trials were presented in an active condition
(with participants choosing the lottery themselves), the
other half in a passive condition (with participants observ-
ing the computer randomly choosing between lotteries).
Altogether, the experiment comprised 112 trials (i.e. 28
trials in each of the four conditions social/active, social/
passive, non-social/active, non-social/passive), presented
in random order. In each trial, participants first read the
corresponding experimental condition on a text slide for
2.5 sec before the two possible lotteries were shown. After
one of the two lotteries had been chosen, this lottery was
marked on the screen, and subsequently the outcome of
both the chosen and the non-chosen lottery were shown.
Importantly, the task was constructed in such a way that
each specific gain or loss number was presented in only
one task trial. Thus, participants processed altogether 448
different numbers (four per trial) ranging between −500
and +500. Amounts divisible by 50 were avoided because
such numbers could “pop out” and therefore be inherently
more memorable than other numbers. Furthermore, to
counterbalance any number-specific memory effects, as-
signment of specific lottery pairs to experimental condi-
tions was balanced across participants.
The decision-making task served as the phase of (inci-
dental) memory encoding of the numbers displayed in the
lotteries. The critical memory test followed immediately
thereafter as a surprise recognition memory test. In this
memory test, all the 448 numbers shown in the previous
decision-making task were successively presented again,
intermixed with additional 360 new numbers (likewise
ranging between −500 and +500) and in random order.
For each of the numbers participants had to indicate
whether it was old (presented in one of the trials during
the decision-making task) or new (not presented in the
decision-making task).
To assess individual dispositional empathy, participants
filled in the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI) from
Davis (1983) in a shortened German version provided by
Paulus (2009). As mentioned, the questionnaire contains
four different empathy scales, with two covering cognitive
aspects of empathy (Perspective Taking = adopting the
mental perspective of another person, and Fantasy =
adopting the perspective of a fictional character in a book
or film), and two covering emotional aspects of empathy
(Empathic Concern = experiencing feelings of compassion
and sympathy for others, and Personal Distress = feeling
unease or distress in the face of physical or emotional
harm of another person). Example items are (in English):
“Before criticizing somebody, I try to imagine how I would
feel if I were in their place” (Perspective Taking); “When I
watch a good movie, I can easily put myself in the place ofthe leading character (Fantasy); “When I see someone
taken advantage of, I feel kind of protective toward them”
(Empathic Concern); and “I sometimes feel helpless when
I am in the middle of a very emotional situation” (Personal
Distress). Responses are given for each item on a 5-point
scale ranging from 0 to 4. In the German version that we
used each scale is represented by 4 items, so that the max-
imum score for each of the four scales is 16.Results
Overall memory performance and empathy
Memory performance was calculated as the difference be-
tween hit rate (percentage of previously shown numbers
correctly identified as “old”; 44.3% ± 2.8%) and false alarm
rate (percentage of new numbers incorrectly identified as
“old”; 41.8% ± 2.6%), representing a response-bias inde-
pendent memory index (Snodgrass and Corwin 1988).
This index was overall clearly higher than zero (2.48% ±
0.64%, t(22) = 3.85, p < 0.001, d = 0.80), confirming sub-
stantial residual memory for the numbers, despite the
relatively high task difficulty. Overall memory perform-
ance (across encoding conditions) correlated substantially
with Perspective Taking (r = 0.68, p < 0.001; Figure 2a), but
not with the other empathy scales of the IRI (Fantasy,
r = 0.18; Empathic Concern, r = 0.21; Personal Distress,
r = −0.12; all p > 0.33).Social vs. non-social memory and empathy
Our second analysis referred specifically to the difference in
social vs. non-social memory in relation to empathy. Ac-
cordingly, we calculated for each participant the difference
between memory for socially and non-socially encoded
numbers as the critical dependent variable. (A positive
value of this variable indicates an advantage of social over
non-social memory, while a negative value indicates an
advantage of non-social over social memory encoding.)
This indicator of social memory advantage showed a signifi-
cant positive correlation with Personal Distress (r = 0.46,
p = 0.025; Figure 2b), but not with the other IRI scales (Per-
spective Taking, r = −0.19; Fantasy, r = 0.05; Empathic Con-
cern, r = −0.06, all p > 0.39). Interestingly, the regression
line as depicted in Figure 2b also crosses the zero line of
the x-axis, showing that the overall pattern reverses as Per-
sonal Distress increases. That is, while subjects with low
Personal Distress show an overall memory advantage of
self-related over other-related information, subjects with
high Personal Distress show an overall memory advantage
of other-related over self-related information. Accordingly,
in the group as a whole, there was no overall advantage of
social over non-social memory (0.49% ± 0.99%, t(22) = 0.50,
p = 0.63, for difference from zero).
We additionally performed the following secondary
analyses:
Figure 2 Relationship between empathy and memory performance
(difference hit rate – false alarm rate). (a) Perspective Taking correlated
with overall memory performance (p < 0.001), (b) while Personal Distress
correlated with differential memory for socially vs. non-socially encoded
numbers (difference social memory – non-social memory, p = 0.025).
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additional 2×2 ANOVA the possibility of an interaction of
the effects of Personal Distress with whether the choice of
the lottery was actively performed or passively observed
(factor “Active/Passive”), dichotomizing the empathy
factor Personal Distress by median split into high and low
scorers. (Two participants scoring exactly on the median
of Personal Distress were excluded from this analysis for
optimal discrimination between groups.) This ANOVA
confirmed a significant main effect of Personal Distress
(F(1,19 = 6.11, p = 0.023, ηp
2 = 0.24, reflecting the positive
correlation mentioned above), but Personal Distress did
not interact with the factor “Active/Passive” (F(1,19) < 1).
Thus, the effect of Personal Distress on memory did not
depend on whether the information on possible outcomes
was encoded under active or passive choice conditions.
Independent of Personal Distress, the memory differencebetween social and non-social memory tended to be lower
for numbers from active trials than from passive trials
(F(1,19) = 2.98, p = 0.10, ηp
2 = 0.13, for main effect “Ac-
tive/Passive”).
Lottery outcome. Inherent to the lottery game, part of
the numbers, i.e. those finally drawn as lottery outcomes,
were shown again in the end of the trials, increasing both
their psychological relevance and their overall encoding
time in comparison to other numbers. Therefore, in an-
other complementing ANOVA, we further explored the
possibility that the effect of Personal Distress depended on
whether numbers were actually realized as lottery out-
comes or not. For this purpose, the factor Outcome (out-
come numbers vs. non-outcome numbers) was included
as an additional within-subjects factor. There was an over-
all main effect of Outcome, with enhanced social memory
superiority for realized compared to non-realized numbers
(F(1,19) = 7.10, p = 0.015, ηp
2 = 0.27). However, Personal
Distress did not interact with this factor, neither alone
(F(1,19) = 0.10, p = 0.76, for Personal Distress x Outcome
interaction) or in combination with the factor “Active/Pas-
sive” (F(1,19) = 0.07, p = 0.80, for Personal Distress x Out-
come x Active/Passive interaction).
Response times. We also performed an ANOVA on re-
sponse times, i.e. the time participants needed to choose
their preferred lottery, as an additional control analysis
to rule out that the results could be explained simply by
differences in encoding times between conditions. (The
two lotteries were shown on the screen as long as partic-
ipants needed to decide – although with an upper limit
of 8 seconds, but this was rarely exceeded –, so longer
response times would also result in longer opportunity
to encode the respective numbers). This control analysis
confirmed that response times (overall averaging 3.49
sec) did not depend on Personal Distress, Self/Other, or
Active/Passive conditions (p > 0.12, for all main effects
and interactions). Thus, the memory effects could not
simply be attributed to differences in encoding times be-
tween conditions.
Gender. Women typically show higher empathy than
men (Davis, 1983; Baron-Cohen and Wheelwright, 2004).
Thus, our results could theoretically simply reflect gender
difference in empathy, rather than genuine effects of em-
pathy. In the present study, women indeed scored higher
than men in Perspective Taking (12.4 ± 0.73 vs. 9.92 ± 0.79,
t(21) = 2.24, p = 0.036, d = 0.98; similarly for Fantasy, 11.4 ±
0.67 vs. 8.08 ± 0.94, p = 0.013, d = 1.14, and Empathic Con-
cern, 11.7 ± 0.73 vs. 9.38 ± 0.74, p = 0.040, d = 0.92), but
there was no difference between women and men in
Personal Distress (7.40 ± 0.88 vs. 6.69 ± 0.51, t(21) = 0.73,
p = 0.47). Thus, a gender confound would be possible here
for the result of a correlation between Perspective Taking
and overall memory performance. However, when we cal-
culated this correlation separately for both sexes, the
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two subgroups (r = 0.68, p = 0.031, for women; r = 0.76,
p = 0.003, for men). Furthermore, an ANOVA on memory
performance including gender as a between-subjects factor
together with the within-subjects factors Self/Other and
Active/Passive revealed no significant effect involving gen-
der (all p > 0.18).
Discussion
We investigated the relationship between empathy, as mea-
sured by Davis’ (1983) IRI, and social vs. non-social mem-
ory formation in healthy humans. The social factor in
memory formation was defined as the way in which other-
wise comparable stimuli (here numbers) were encoded,
namely as either relevant to oneself (non-social condition)
or to another person (social condition). Two main results
were obtained, indicating differential involvement of cogni-
tive and affective aspects of empathy in memory formation.
First, Perspective Taking, a prototypical measure of cogni-
tive empathic capabilities, correlated with overall memory
performance regardless of encoding conditions. Second,
and specific to the social vs. non-social nature of encoding,
Personal Distress, a measure of affective empathic reac-
tions, correlated with the relative advantage of social as
compared to non-social memory encoding. Control ana-
lyses showed that these findings could not be accounted for
simply by other factors affecting encoding, such as encod-
ing time or active vs. passive encoding.
Our result of a positive relationship between Perspective
Taking and general memory performance is in line with
clinical findings reporting reduced empathy, specifically in
the cognitive domain, in neurological patients with pri-
mary memory impairments (Cuerva et al. 2001; Gregory
et al. 2002; Beadle et al. 2013; Fernandez-Duque et al.
2010). Here, we confirm and extend these results by dem-
onstrating a positive correlation between Perspective Tak-
ing and general memory performance in a non-clinical
sample of young healthy participants. This finding is also
in line with the only previous study we are aware of that
directly addressed in a sample of healthy participants the
relationship between a behavioral measure of perspective
taking and the extent of memory encoding of experimen-
tally presented material (Stiller and Dunbar, 2007). Al-
though these authors were primarily interested in the
independent predictive values of perspective taking and
memory performance for participants’ social network
sizes, their data also show that the two cognitive abilities
were strongly associated with each other, consistent with
our findings here based on dispositional perspective tak-
ing, with likewise large effect sizes.
Importantly, our data additionally point to a specific role
of affective empathy and particularly Personal Distress
with regard to the social factor in memory encoding. That
is, not Perspective Taking, but Personal Distress appearsto be associated with sensitivity specifically to the social
nature of information in the context of mnemonic pro-
cessing. In fact, participants high in Personal Distress
tended to remember socially encoded information better
than non-socially encoded information, while participants
with low Personal Distress showed a result in the opposite
direction, consistent with the typical “self-reference effect”
in memory, i.e. better memory when participants encode
items in a way forming associations in relation to them-
selves than in another semantic manner (Symons and
Johnson 1997).
Our finding that affective but not cognitive empathy
was associated with differential encoding of social vs. non-
social information is in line with our idea that emotional
factors determine these differential effects. Specifically, al-
though our experiment was not designed to reveal the
underlying mechanisms by which empathic capabilities
affect memory encoding, we assume emotional arousal as
a critical underlying factor. Participants with high affective
empathy, more than those with low affective empathy, are
likely to react with enhanced emotional arousal specific-
ally in the social as compared to the non-social gamble
situation. Emotional arousal is well known to enhance
memory formation, an effect that is neurobiologically
linked to amygdala activation and related neurophysio-
logical mechanisms (e.g., LaBar and Cabeza 2006; Wagner
and Born 2008). This explanation fits with the fact that
the relative benefit of social memory was specifically asso-
ciated with the affective empathy aspect of Personal Dis-
tress, defined by feelings of personal anxiety and unease in
tense interpersonal settings, but not Empathic Concern,
defined by feelings of sympathy and concern towards
unfortunate others, which represents a calmer and hence
presumably less physiologically arousing type of affective
reactivity (Davis 1983). Thus, in particular participants
with high dispositional empathic Personal Distress may
have been more emotionally aroused, with concomitant
amygdala activation, when they knew that a gamble
affected the fate of the other person rather than them-
selves, leading to enhanced encoding for the numbers pre-
sented. Hence, our data suggest that mechanism by which
empathy-related processes can specifically enhance the
encoding of social memory contents are basically relying
on the same mechanism as memory-enhancing effects of
emotion in general, i.e. emotional arousal. While this idea
needs to be tested in future neuroscientifc studies more
directly, there is an interesting parallel to conclusions
about overlapping mechanisms in empathy and memory
domains from studies relating to retrieval of memory (as
opposed to memory encoding on which we focus here).
Markedly overlapping brain networks in tasks of autobio-
graphical memory retrieval and tasks of perspective taking
(as well as tasks of future imagination) in frontal, medial
temporal and posterior parietal areas have led to the idea
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projection, where the self has to be decontextualized from
the current situation (Buckner and Carroll, 2007; Spreng
and Mar, 2012). Interestingly, a recent study also showed
that when participants read about a person in need, im-
agining a vivid scenario of helping the person as well as
remembering a related past event from their own life in
which they had helped, led to subsequent increase in their
actual willingness to help (Gaesser and Schacter, 2014).
Our data suggest that such overlap may be analogously
relevant at the encoding stage, and draw specific attention
to the emotional aspects of empathy-related processing with
regard to the encoding of socially relevant information.
Because empathic concern is frequently regarded as the
most prototypical aspect of affective empathy, one could ask
why personal distress but not empathic concern was most
strongly associated with the superior encoding of social vs.
non-social information. However, assuming arousal induced
by personal distress as an underlying mechanism, our data
are in line with conceptual discussions in which personal
distress is regarded as “empathic overarousal”, associated
with enhanced physiological reactions which entail stronger
self-focus rather than concern for the other (Eisenberg and
Fabes, 1990; Eisenberg, 2000). On this basis, these and other
authors have distinguished between empathy (basically an
equivalent of the term “empathic concern” as used here, by
some authors also referred to as “sympathy”) on the one
hand, and personal distress on the other hand (Batson et al.
1983; Eisenberg, 2000; Carrera et al., 2013). The issue in
how far personal distress conceptually belongs to or is dis-
tinct from empathy cannot be resolved within this paper,
but we think that it is at least appropriate to refer to per-
sonal distress, if based on the suffering of others, as an
empathy-related process.
Limitations
A major limitation of our study is the small sample size,
which makes it necessary to confirm our findings in future
replications. However, in the relatively novel research field
of empathy-memory relationships, it provides incremental
information in a sample of healthy adults, for which avail-
able data are currently sparse. By focusing on memory
encoding, and in this context distinguishing between en-
coding of social and non-social information, the study also
introduces new aspects not yet considered in previous ac-
counts of the topic. A specific methodological advantage
of our study design is that it allowed us to vary the social
vs. non-social nature of stimuli to be encoded strictly by
experimental manipulation. That is, the exactly same
stimulus (with no inherent social meaning) could be
encoded in either a social or a non-social way. Thereby,
confounds by different features of the stimuli themselves
could be ruled out. However, it is also to be noted that our
task differed from more usual memory paradigms also byother specificities. For example, each trial was associated
with real monetary consequences (for either the self or
another person). Also, we intentionally presented a child in
need of medical treatment as the “other person”, rather than
someone anonymous, in order to create a particularly
empathy-conducive situation in the social condition. It is
conceivable that effects of the large size that we were able to
detect here even with a relatively small sample size, and con-
sequently low power, would not necessarily occur with more
subtle manipulations of the social factor in memory. There-
fore, the generalizability of our present findings should be
tested with different memory tasks and larger samples sizes.
Another limitation is that our assessment of empathy
was confined to self-report measures as provided by the
IRI. However, clinical studies demonstrate that patient
groups showing disturbed empathy as measured by the IRI
also perform worse in objective tests of empathy and social
behavior as well as in judgments of patients’ empathic skills
by relatives (Cusi et al. 2010, 2012; Shany-Ur et al., 2012;
Beadle et al., 2013), and direct correlations of IRI measures
with objective empathy measures in healthy subjects con-
firm a generally positive relationship (Rogers et al. 2007;
Dziobek et al. 2008). These findings indicate that biases to
which self reports may be more susceptible than other
measures (e.g., social desirability) do not challenge their
general validity. Still, future studies further examining the
relationship between empathy and memory should also
include objective tests of empathy. Another aspect to be
further explored in relation to memory processing would
be state empathy, i.e. transient empathic reactions to spe-
cific situations, rather than dispositional trait empathy that
was in the research focus here. Furthermore, especially
from the perspective of basic research that we are adopting
here, more non-clinical studies would be needed to circum-
vent the interpretation problems that arise from data ob-
tained in patient groups, as mentioned above (see also
Choong and Doody 2013).
Conclusion
Together, the present study provides the first systematic
investigation of the relationship between empathic and
mnemonic abilities in healthy humans, distinguishing be-
tween social and non-social memory formation. We show
that cognitive empathy (specifically Perspective Taking) is
associated with higher memory performance in general (in
line with previous conclusions derived mostly from clin-
ical studies), while affective empathy (specifically Personal
Distress) is associated with enhanced differential memory
performance for social in comparison to non-social infor-
mation. The underlying mechanisms are still to be speci-
fied, as well as the generalizability of the results. On a
broader view, this research strengthens new scientific di-
rections that attempt to reveal how social factors influence
memory processes (Echterhoff and Hirst, 2009).
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